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Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Abstract The Aristotelian trichotomy distinguishes three aspects of ar-
gumentation: Logos, Ethos, and Pathos. Even rich argumentation rep-
resentations like the Argument Interchange Format (AIF) are only con-
cerned with capturing the Logos aspect. Inference Anchoring Theory
(IAT) adds the possibility to represent ethical requirements on the il-
locutionary force edges linking locutions to illocutions, thereby allow-
ing to capture some aspects of ethos. With the recent extensions AIF+
and Social Argument Interchange Format (S-AIF), which embed dia-
logue and speakers into the AIF argumentation representation, the basis
for representing all three aspects identified by Aristotle was formed. In
the present work, we develop the Trichotomic Argument Interchange
Format (T-AIF), building on the idea from S-AIF of adding the speakers
to the argumentation graph. We capture Logos in the usual known from
AIF+, Ethos in form of weighted edges between actors representing trust,
and Pathos via weighted edges from actors to illocutions representing
their level of commitment to the propositions. This extended structured
argumentation representation opens up new possibilities of defining se-
mantic properties on this rich graph in order to characterize and profile
the reasoning patterns of the participating actors.
Keywords: Logos · Ethos · Pathos · Structured Argumentation · Trust ·
Dialogue Structure ·Argument Interchange Format · Inference Anchoring
1 Introduction
Argumentation plays a central role in society for forming rational opinions about
controversial topics by providing a way to resolve conflicting views. For under-
standing complex argumentative discussions it is helpful to draw diagrams called
argument maps that visualize how the propositions and arguments interact with
one another. Having such a formal representation for argumentation also al-
lows for having computational semantics for them to aid humans in evaluating
argumentation.
Over the years there have been many developments of such argumenta-
tion frameworks with varying information content and complexity. One of the
simplest forms of argumentation frameworks are the so called Abstract Argu-
mentation Frameworks (AAFs) that treat arguments as abstract objects without
having attached internal structure.
⋆ Work forms part of the DFG Project “Reconstructing Arguments from Noisy Text”
(RANT) within SPP 1999 RATIO.
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Abstract Argumentation Frameworks consist of a graph having arguments as
nodes without any additional structure or information apart from the relations
connecting them to other arguments. Dung [19] popularized the simplest form
of these frameworks (see Definition 1) with only a single relation representing
attack between arguments.
Definition 1 (Dung AAF [20]). An abstract argumentation framework AF =
(AR,→) is composed of a set AR of arguments and an attack relation → ⊆
AR × AR. An argument A ∈ AR is called an attacker of B ∈ AR if A → B.
A set of arguments S ⊆ AR attacks B if there exists A ∈ S s.t. A → B. S
defends A if S attacks each attacker of A. S is conflict-free if it does not attack
its own arguments. S is admissible if it is conflict-free and defends each of its
arguments. The characteristic function of AF is defined by FAF (S) := {A ∈
AR | S defends A}. S ⊆ AR is:
• a stable extension if it is conflict-free and attacks each argument A 6∈ S;
• a preferred extension if it is a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) admissible set
of arguments;
• a complete extension if it is admissible and contains each argument it defends
(or equivalently a conflict-free fixed point of FAF );
• a grounded extension if it is the least complete extension (or equivalently the
least fixed point of FAF ).
While being algorithmically and conceptionally simple, having only an attack
relation limits the expressivity of the framework. In argumentation, it is often
the case that one argument supports the truth of another argument, and it is
not always easy to express this as an attack. Bipolar Argumentation Frame-
works (BAFs) [15] add a support relation between arguments to capture those
situations. The semantics of BAFs is a priori somewhat less clear-cut than that
of AAF, however, as one needs to determine how support and attach interact.
One approach, extensively discussed by Cohen et al. [17], is to derive complex
attacks from joining support and attack relations and thus reduce to Dung se-
mantics. Another way is to move from crisp notions of accept and reject towards
a weighted acceptance where supporters and attackers are accumulated into the
acceptability of an argument [1,29,2]. The weighted approach however comes at
the cost of requiring acyclicity of the graph as evident in the overview of current
bipolar semantics by Amgoud and Ben-Naim [1].
Structured Argumentation Frameworks go beyond this abstract view of argu-
mentation and attach structure to the argument map. There are multiple points
where one can add information to obtain a richer argument representation. One
way is to add structure to the nodes, e.g. in the form of logical formulas repres-
enting the propositions and reasoning patterns used in an argument [5,13,3,28].
This allows using logical reasoning to find conflicts and inferences between the
arguments and generating new arguments from existing facts and inference rules.
Structure can also be added to the edges in the form of identifying different kinds
of inferences, conflicts, or exceptions. Argument structure and the classification
of different types of arguments have been studied widely [39,33,42,45,41].
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Toulmin [39] proposed that arguments generally obey a basic structure,
commonly referred to as the Toulmin Scheme, consisting of identifiable parts
that justify why a listener should believe the qualified conclusion. Perelman
and Olbrechts-Tyteca [33] informally categorized different types of arguments
and analysed what makes them convincing. Walton [42] combined these efforts
and created a compendium of different Argumentation Schemes with a common
structure of identifying multiple premises necessary to reasonably derive the
truth of an argument’s claim. Additionally, he identified so called critical ques-
tions specific to each scheme, which a critically thinking audience can put forth
to undermine arguments employing that scheme, as in the following example.
Example 2 (Scheme: Argument from Position to Know [45]).
Major Premise: Source a is in a position to know about things in a certain
subject domain S containing proposition A
Minor Premise: a asserts that A is true (false)
Conclusion: A is true (false)
Critical Questions: 1. Is a in a position to know whether A is true (false)?
2. Is a an honest (trustworthy, reliable) source?
3. Did a assert that A is true (false)?
For an in-depth review of this style of argumentation schemes as well as a his-
torical overview of classifying different patterns of argumentation see the book
by Walton et al. [45]. Due to their nature of clearly identifying premises and
claim of an argument, Walton-style schemes are a good candidate for complex
edge labels in an argumentation map.
The Argument Interchange Format (AIF) is a formal representation of argu-
mentation general enough to include many existing representations in order to
establish a standard for storing and exchanging argumentation [16]. Inferences
in AIF can be labelled with instances of rule schemes which can be Walton–style
argumentation schemes but are not limited to those. Some of these schemes are
implemented in the AIF ontology, which specifies the overall format and accom-
panying concepts intended as labels for the participating propositions.
To represent argumentative discourse between multiple actors, the AIF was
later extended to AIF+ by Modgil and McGinnis [27] and by Reed et al. [36],
who introduce new types of nodes representing the dialogue structure through
dialogue moves relating locutions.
Inference Anchoring Theory (IAT) introduced the idea to incorporate illocu-
tionary force into argument maps for relating locutions and illocutions as well as
transitions and inferences/conflicts [12,10,11]. Having such links between state-
ments and their content also allows specifying requirements on force edges, e.g.
that the speaker is trustworthy. This can be seen as capturing ethical require-
ments similar to premises of Walton-style argumentation schemes, expressing
that a witness is trustworthy in an Argument from Witness Testimony. In the
extension by Reed et al. [35], AIF+ already has the capabilities necessary to
represent IAT annotated argumentation maps.
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Recently, Lawrence et al. [22] formalized an adjunct ontology to AIF+ called
the Social Argument Interchange Format (S-AIF), which incorporates the au-
thors of locutions into the model. They use this to calculate various statistics
about the discussion, such as participation and agreement-based author cluster-
ing. We build on this idea in Section 2 where we propose the Trichotomic Argu-
ment Interchange Format T-AIF, which formally captures even more aspects of
argumentation. S-AIF distinguishes between the roles of Argument Web parti-
cipants and is tailored towards augmented argument construction and statistics,
while our aim is to represent existing arguments in more detail.
Argumentation in AIF+ is represented through different types of connected
nodes with corresponding semantic meaning. The nodes in the actual argument-
ation graph are instances of the concepts from the upper ontology with related
instances of concepts from the forms ontology specifying the schemes for the
S-nodes as well as concepts to classify the I-nodes into the various forms (see
the appendix).
I-nodes represent Illocutions and hence contain the propositions relevant for
the arguments as premises, exceptions, and conclusions. The AIF defines con-
cepts necessary to classify these nodes to participate in Walton-style argument-
ation schemes.
L-nodes represent Locutions and contain the raw utterances that make up
the represented dialogue. They can be seen as illocutions in the sense that they
carry the propositional content that their text was uttered in the conversation.
In S-AIF, L-nodes are connected with nodes representing the authors of the
locution.
S-nodes represent Schemes for interconnecting nodes. These schemes are as-
sociated with scheme application nodes for the various kinds of interconnections
between nodes:
RA Instances of rule schemes, such as Walton-style schemes.
TA Instances of transition schemes representing speech acts in dialogue.
CA Instances of conflict schemes capture that truth of propositions is in conflict.
PA Instances of preference schemes, which resolve conflicts via preference rules.
YA Instances of illocutionary schemes modelling illocutionary force as a link
between locutions, illocutions, inferences, and transitions.
The semantics of AIF graphs is defined by translating into ASPIC [6] and then
evaluating using, e.g., the TOAST algorithm [38].
ASPIC is a framework for building structured argumentation systems with a
strong logical background following the ideas of Besnard and Hunter [5] where
the nodes are sets of formulas representing a derivation tree [34,6]. They distin-
guish between strict and defeasible inferences and require the syntax of the logic
language of the nodes to contain each instance of a defesaible inference to allow
attacks on inferences. Apart from this form of attack they also have attacks on
premises and conclusions via a unidirectional relation specifying that one for-
mula is contrary to another. ASPIC builds on an extended notion of abstract
argumentation system [40] and was generalised to ASPIC+ [34] by partitioning
inferences and facts into an undeniable and a defeasible part [26].
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2 The Trichotomic Argument Interchange Format T-AIF
Aristotle [4] noted that argument content is not the only relevant aspect for
human argument evaluation. He distinguished between three means of persuasion
forming the so called Aristotelian Trichotomy:
Logos: Appeal to logic. The structure of the argumentation both of individual
reasoning steps and the overall interaction of multiple arguments, e.g. argu-
mentation schemes used.
Ethos: Appeal to authority. The properties of the speaker relevant for the eval-
uation of argument, e.g. credibility or moral values.
Pathos: Appeal to emotion. The emotional aspects of an argument, e.g. enthu-
siasm of the speaker or intended emotional reaction from the audience.
Surprisingly, to our knowledge all formal representations for argumentation are
mostly focused on the logos aspect of argumentation. The Trichotomic Argument
Interchange Format (T-AIF) aims to incorporate all three aspects into the formal
representation to allow representing arguments in a richer way. It consists of three
interconnected parts representing different aspects of the argumentation.
2.1 Trust Network
Building on ideas of Lawrence et al. [22], we include the speakers into the argu-
mentation representation. Other entities such as politicians, news organisations,
or other groups that might participate in the discussion through citation or quo-
tation are also included. We call these E-nodes given that they represent Entities
as unifying concept over active and passive participants of the conversation.
While Lawrence et al. use their speaker nodes mostly for statistics and group-
ing, we also use them to represent ethos and pathos through weighted edges in
the graph. The ethos aspect is incorporated by weighted edges between E-nodes
capturing the notion of trust of active participants towards other entities forming
a trust network [32]. One could have multiple different trust relations between
the entities to capture the different means of trust described in the literature
[14,18,21,31,37] but in the following we are mostly concerned with trust as the
confidence an actor has in another actor’s utterances.
The grade of commitment of the speakers towards their illocutions is a pathos
aspect represented in the graph. Distinguishing between different levels of com-
mitment or tracking the commitment of actors is mostly studied in the context
of dialogue games [44,24,25,46,11] but we believe it has relevant interconnec-
tions with a speaker’s ethos. Strongly committing to propositions obligates an
actor to defend them when challenged and should have a negative effect on her
trustworthiness when this fails [30]. In contrast, an actor voicing arguments for
the opposing view besides her own should receive increased trust due to seeming
well-informed and not being afraid of attacks on her own stance.
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2.2 Dialogue Structure
This part of the argumentation representation captures the raw locutions the
actors have put forth. The Locutions are represented as textual labels in L-
nodes. Connecting the L-nodes via the reply relation forms a lattice structure.
Intuitively one would assume this to form a tree structure but an utterance may
reference multiple other locutions resulting in multiple parents.
Apart from the reply relation, locutions are connected to moves from a dia-
logue game giving meaning to their interconnections. Moreover, they are con-
nected to illocution nodes (described in Section 2.3) via illocutionary force edges
as seen widely in previous work [35,12,10,11]. Note that in the interest of clarity,
our representation uses typed labelled edges to represent illocutionary force and
dialog relations in favour of having YA- and TA-nodes.
It is beneficial to keep the locutions of the dialogue in the representation of
the argumentation to enable a broader applicability of the format as a source
structure containing both argumentation and dialogue. This structure serves as
witness for the temporal development of the argumentation, and thus e.g. allows
penalizing unfavourable moves or decisions in the dialogue game as proposed by
Walton [43]. Penalizing or rewarding based on logical content as briefly men-
tioned at the end of Section 2.1 also becomes expressible as a result of having
the locutions as nodes in T-AIF graphs.
2.3 Argument Map
Due to unknown background knowledge of the discussion participants and en-
thymemes dominating real argumentative discussions, we cannot assume the
represented argument maps to be complete without unknown parts. From the
dialogue relations we can infer argumentative relations even if the precise reas-
oning patterns in use are not clear. We assume that the participants of the
discussion voice complaints if the connections between propositions are unclear
to a human participant with relevant background knowledge. Hence, we assume
that enthymemes and skipped reasoning steps are not fallacious but covered by
knowledge available at the time.
Our argument map is similar to the one defined in the AIF specification [16]
but our I-nodes are labelled with logical formulas (without committing to a par-
ticular logic) representing the propositional content of the Illocution. Attacks
and supports have schemes similar to the ones proposed by the AIF but restrict
the shape of participating propositions according to their nature (e.g. as spe-
cified by Walton [42] or Parsons et al. [31]). The Application of these schemes is
represented in the graph by SA-nodes and AA-nodes for Support and Attacks,
respectively. Exceptions to these schemes are represented as propositions of spe-
cified shape connecting to the application nodes directly. We allow E-nodes to
be connected via attack and support nodes to express ethical requirements on
entities or infer ethical properties of these respectively.
We leave out the preference nodes from AIF in our formalism as preferences
are inherently a per entity concept and our argument map represents all actors’
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contributions. Preferences of the actors are not inexpressible this way but are
rather expressed through trust and commitment in the sense that an actor likely
prefers her own arguments or those made by highly truted entities over those
made by untrusted entities.
Due to elided reasoning steps the uttered propositions in real argumentative
conversations might not have the required shapes for the reasoning patterns they
are involved in (see Example 3). Filling these reasoning steps from common sense
and common knowledge is an easy task for humans (albeit not uniquely) but a
very hard task for machines as analysed by Boltužić and Šnajder [8].
Example 3 (Elided Steps in Typical Reasoning). ‘Experts say that Brexit
would hurt the economy, so we should vote against Brexit.’ Here the main ar-
gumentation scheme involved is Argument from Expert Opinion based on the
fact that experts are quoted. The drawn conclusion by the definition of that
scheme [45] would be that ‘Brexit would hurt the economy’ and not that ‘UK
citizens should vote against Brexit’.
We resort to accepting this lack of information and capturing the unknown
reasoning patterns by having default inferences connecting the perceived to the
required proposition. So in the case of Example 3 we would have the conclusion of
the argument from expert opinion be that ‘Brexit would hurt the economy’ and
add a default inference from there to ‘UK citizens should vote against Brexit’.
Similarly, we add required premises and exceptions to the scheme applications
to complete enthymemes without committing entities to these.
Brexit EU harms UK
EU has bad intentionsEU harms UK fishermen
EU must harm EU fishermen
¬ EU harms Norway fishermen Norway is in the EU
EU protects employees
EU protects nature
B 0.8
0.6
0.9
0.8
0.9
A
0.6 0.7
0.6
Figure 1. Simplified extract from a Twitter discussion between A and B on Brexit.
Red arrows represent attack while green arrows represent support. The weighted black
edges represent the commitment of the actors to the propositions.
3 Semantics
For reasoning about T-AIF we define a reduced representing structure and
define properties on it as fuzzy formulas to give an example of what is pos-
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sible within this formalism. We use the standard Łukasiewicz semantics of fuzzy
logic (see Lukasiewicz and Straccia [23] for an overview):
Definition 4 (Łukasiewicz Semantics [23]).
I(φ ∧ ψ) = max(I(φ) + I(ψ)− 1, 0) I(φ ∨ ψ) = min(I(φ) + I(ψ), 1)
I(φ→ ψ) = min(1− I(φ) + I(ψ), 1) I(¬φ) = 1− I(φ)
In particular, φ↔ ψ is interpreted into 1− |I(φ) − I(ψ)| in Łukasiewicz Logic,
which matches the intuition we intend in our formulas. All sets mentioned in the
following definitions are assumed to be finite unless mentioned otherwise.
Definition 5 (Trichotomic Argumentation Framework (T-AF)). A Tri-
chotomic Argumentation Framework (Pi, Pe, S, as, es, (sis, Is)s∈S , (Ox)x∈Pe) is a
structure over sets
• P = Pi ⊎ Pe of propositions formed from illocutions Pi and entities Pe,
• S = Satt⊎Ssup of atomic argumentation schemes formed from attack schemes
Satt and support schemes Ssup,
with additional data
• as : S → N representing the arity of schemes,
• es : S → N representing the exception arity of schemes,
• sis : [0, 1]
as(s) → [0, 1]es(s) → [0, 1]→ [0, 1] representing the interpretation of
atomic schemes,
• Is ⊆ P
as(s)×P es(s)×P representing atomic argumentation actions, relating
the givens or premises and the exceptions to the claim or conclusion, and
• Ox : P → ([0, 1]→ [0, 1]) representing belief.
Remark 6 (Entities as Propositions). Argumentation actions can include
entities as premises and conclusions. An entity seen as a proposition is to be read
as the trustworthiness of the entity. Therefore, an Ad Hominem argument against
entity x would be an argumentation action with e as conclusion prescribing low
trustworthiness. Trust establishment or propagation schemes as described by
Parsons et al. [31] can be modelled as inferences perscribing high trustworthiness
to an entity. Additionally, treating entities as propositions enables the trust
relations decribed in Section 2.1 to be incorporated into the belief predicate O.
Example 7 (Kinds of inferences in T-AFs). Note that the signature of the
scheme interpretation function si has as additional argument the acceptability of
the conclusion. It can therefore be seen as a fuzzy predicate over the combination
of givens, exceptions, and claim where givens and exceptions are the propositions
related to a claim by an argumentation action. This allows expressing different
concepts, and combinations thereof, via this single notion:
• Exceptions can produce a predicate that accepts all truth values of the claim
as the exception defeats the argumentation action;
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• Weighted premises as seen in the specification of Walton-style schemes can
be incorporated through linear combination of the givens;
• Necessary conditions can produce a predicate specifying that the claim can
not be accepted unless the givens are accepted: ¬p → ¬c (read, e.g., as a
fuzzy formula). This is what Boudhar et al. [9] call necessary support ;
• Sufficient conditions can produce a predicate specifying that the claim has
to be accepted when the givens are accepted: p→ c. This is what Boella et
al. [7] call deductive support ;
• Inhibiting conditions can produce a predicate specifying that the claim can
not be accepted unless the givens are rejected: p→ ¬c;
• Disjunctive conditions can produce a predicate specifying that the givens or
the claim need to be accepted: ¬p→ c;
Similarly, belief is interpreted as a predicate O rather than a single truth value,
thus capturing belief and disbelief as well as uncertainty.
Definition 8 (Scheme Interpretation). The scheme interpretation is required
to adhere to the given type of argumentation scheme: An attack (support) is in-
terpreted as a fuzzy predicate that allows increasing (decreasing) acceptance of
the claim if the acceptance of the premises increases. This is made explicit in
the following constraints for scheme interpretation:
∧
s∈Ssup;p¯,q¯∈[0,1]as(s);c∈[0,1]
p¯ ≤ q¯ →
∨
c′∈[0,1]
c ≤ c′ ∧ sis(p¯,⊥
es(s), c) ≤ sis(q¯,⊥
es(s), c′)
∧
s∈Satt;p¯,q¯∈[0,1]as(s);c∈[0,1]
p¯ ≤ q¯ →
∨
c′∈[0,1]
c′ ≤ c ∧ sis(p¯,⊥
es(s), c) ≤ sis(q¯,⊥
es(s), c′)
Example 9 (Logically: Argument from Position to Know). Consider a
logical representation of Argument from Position to Know (Example 2) using an
epistemic modality Ba, read “a believes that”, and a modality La for locution,
read “a said that”:
BaA↔ A LaA LaA→ BaA (Position to Know)
A
Critical questions 1 and 3 are modelled as attacks against truth of the premises
while question 2 would be an attack against an added honesty premise LaA →
BaA. As E-nodes are treated as propositions for their honesty the third premise
would be represented simply by a. Note that the inference is deductively valid and
therefore can have no exceptions but only attacks on premises. This also leads to
a uniform weighting of premises; hence the interpretation for the scheme would
correspond to the formula
(
(BaA ↔ A) ∧ LaA ∧ a
)
→ A involving illocutions
BaA↔ A, LaA, and A as well as the entity a.
Due to having diverse and joint notions of inference, forming complex attacks to
derive sensible semantics becomes more challenging [1,17].
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Definition 10 (Composite Schemes). Define the extended sets of complex
support (attack) schemes S′sup (S
′
att) and their union S
′ of complex schemes
inductively:
• Ssup ⊆ S
′
sup and Satt ⊆ S
′
att
• Given schemes s ∈ S′sup, t ∈ S
′ and i ∈ as(t) define the composite scheme
s;i t. Depending on wether t was an attack or a support, s;i t belongs to S′att
or S′sup, respectively.
The composite scheme s;i t is interpreted as follows:
as(s;i t) = as(s) + as(t)− 1
es(s;i t) = es(s) + es(t)
Is;it = {(u1, . . . , ui−1, v¯, ui+1, . . . , uas(t), e¯, f¯ , p) | (v¯, e¯, piiu¯) ∈ Is, (u¯, f¯ , p) ∈ It}
sis;it(u1, . . . , ui−1, v¯, ui+1, . . . , uas(t), e¯, f¯ , p) =∨
b∈[0,1] sis(v¯, e¯, b) ∧ sit(u1, . . . , b, . . . , uas(t), f¯ , p)
Note that S′att or S
′
sup may be infinite if there are cycles in the graph that allow
infinite composition.
For classifying extensions in our T-AFs, we follow the approach of graded bi-
polar frameworks, which define a fuzzy labelling specifying the acceptability of
an argument. Using graded acceptance, uncertainty and preferences can be in-
corporated.
Definition 11. A labelling for a T-AF is a function l : P → [0, 1] assigning to
each proposition a degree of acceptance. Let L denote the set of all labellings.
Properties of labellings and actors can then be expressed as fuzzy formulas over
T-AFs. Entities can be grouped based on the similarity of their beliefs, e.g. in
order to reason about group dynamics.
Definition 12 (Similarity). Two actors x, y in a T-AF are considered similar
if they have voiced similar belief.
Sim(x, y) :=
∧
l∈L;p∈P Ox(p, l(p))↔ Oy(p, l(p))
Definition 13 (Attack & Support). A proposition p is attacked under a
given labelling l if there is an attack (complex or atomic) with accepted givens,
rejected exceptions, and claim p:
Att l(p) :=
∨
s∈S′att;(q¯,p)∈Is
∧
i∈as(s) l(piiq¯) ∧
∧
i∈es(s) ¬l(pias(s)+iq¯)
The definition of support Supl(p) is similar but with s ∈ S
′
sup.
In Dung-style AAFs (Definition 1), the semantics is mostly defined in terms of a
notion of defense, which needs to be suitable adapted in the presence of supports
and exceptions:
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Definition 14 (Defense). A proposition p is defended under a labelling l if
every attack against p is defeated. That is, either a given of the attack is attacked
or an exception is supported by accepted propositions:
Def l(p) :=
∧
s∈S′att;(q¯,p)∈Is
∨
i∈as(s) Att l(piiq¯) ∨
∨
i∈es(s) Supl(pias(s)+iq¯)
In AAFs, the notion of attack induces a notion of conflict-freeness. For T-AFs,
we generalize this concept to a notion of consistency effectively incorporating
both attack and support.
Definition 15 (Consistency). A labelling l for a T-AF is consistent if the
assigned labels are in accordance with the argumentation actions of the system.
Co(l) :=
∧
s∈S;(v¯,p)∈Is
sis(l[v¯], l(p))
(To see that this does indeed generalize the standard notion of conflict-freeness,
introduce a unary attack scheme and equip it with mutual exclusion between
the given and the claim as the schema interpretation.)
Remark 16. Note that Co(l) can be seen as the evaluation of the formula∧
s∈S;(v¯,p)∈Is
s(v¯, p) under the labelling l but we prefer to write it as defined
because we later need to talk about different labellings in the same formula.
The extensions in the style of Dung [19] become fuzzy predicates defined in terms
of our definition of defense and consistency — that is, a given labelling will not
be absolutely stable, preferred etc., but rather have these properties to a certain
degree, in accordance with our general consideration of weights. We emphasize
that this applies in particular also to preferred and grounded labellings, which
are now ‘maximal’ or ‘least’ not in an absolute but in a fuzzy sense.
Definition 17 (Admissible Labelling). A labelling l is admissible if it is
consistent and each accepted proposition is defended in l:
Adm(l) := Co(l) ∧
∧
p∈P l(p)→ Defl(p)
Definition 18 (Stable Labelling). A labelling l is stable if it is consistent and
each rejected proposition is attacked under l:
Sl(l) := Co(l) ∧
∧
p∈P ¬l(p)→ Att l(p)
Definition 19 (Preferred Labelling). A labelling is preferred if it is a max-
imal admissible labelling:
Pref (l) := Adm(l) ∧
∧
l′∈L
(
Adm(l′)→
( ∧
p∈P
l(p)→ l′(p)
)
→
∧
p∈P
l′(p)→ l(p)
)
Definition 20 (Complete Labelling). A labelling is complete if it is admiss-
ible and accepts each defended proposition:
Cl(l) := Adm(l) ∧
∧
p∈P Def l(p)→ l(p)
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Definition 21 (Grounded Labelling). A labelling is grounded if it is a least
complete labelling of the T-AF:
Gl(l) := Cl(l) ∧
∧
l′∈LCl (l
′)→
∧
p∈P l(p)→ l
′(p)
Apart from translating the definitions of Dung AAFs [19] we can define exem-
plary properties of the actors in the dialogue specific to our extended setting.
Definition 22 (Agreement). A labelling l agrees with an actor x if x’s beliefs
are retained in l:
Ag(l, x) :=
∧
p∈P Ox(p, l(p))
Having defined agreement opens possibilities to express interesting properties
like rationality of an actor.
Definition 23 (Rationality). An actor x is rational if her belief can be ex-
tended to as a consistent position:
Ra(x) :=
∨
l∈L Co(l) ∧ Ag(l, x)
Definition 24 (Justified Trust). An actor x has justified trust if the belief of
actors x trusts can be consistent in the same labelling:
Jt(x) :=
∨
l∈L Co(l) ∧
∧
y∈Pe
(
(Ox(y, l(y)) ∧ l(y))→ Ag(l, y)
)
An actor x having justified trust not only expresses that the actors x trusts have
rational beliefs but also that these beliefs are consistent with eachother.
Definition 25 (Trust Compliance). A labelling l is trust compliant for an
actor x if belief of actors trusted by x is reflected in l:
Tc(l, x) :=
∧
p∈Pi
(∨
y∈Pe
Ox(y, l(y)) ∧ l(y) ∧Oy(p, l(p))
)
Trust compliance expresses that x trusts her trusted actors for validity in the
sense of Demolombe [18] and reflects that in her beliefs (the labelling l). Com-
bining all trusted actors via disjunction captures a similar notion to parallel path
composition as defined by Parsons et al. [32].
4 ASPIC+ Translation
Given that the argument map in T-AIF is very similar to AIF and hence can be
easily converted, we obtain ASPIC+ semantics using an existing translation [6].
That translation can be improved with the additional information available in
our extended formalism to obtain per-actor semantics from the translation.
For constructing the argumentation theory we modify the translation [6] by
forming a separate knowledge base for each actor. An ordering on the formulas in
the knowledge base can be derived from the trust network via the accumulated
trust and commitment of each author. This semantically results in different
systems for each participant that reflect her own beliefs in the propositions as
well as her trust in the other entities participating in the discussion.
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5 Conclusion and future research
We have proposed the Trichotomic Argument Interchange Format, aimed at rep-
resenting argumentation resulting from dialogue between multiple actors, cap-
turing aspects from all three areas of the aristotelian trichotomy. Our format is
inspired by the AIF and especially its extensions AIF+ and S-AIF. The ethos as-
pect is captured by relating entities via trust and allowing their ethical properties
to be involved in arguments. Relating entities to their illocutions incorporates the
strength of their commitment as an aspect from the domain of pathos. Finally,
the argument map represents the logos aspect of argumentation, capturing the
logical connections between the propositions. Given that the AIF and the existing
extending formalisms are specified using the Web Ontology Language (OWL),
we plan to formalize our format in an ontology as well.
Our main contribution in this paper is to provide a formalism for repres-
enting and reasoning about more than just the logos aspect of argumentation.
This enables a very natural treatment, e.g., of Ad Hominem arguments, which
affect the acceptance of all arguments made by the attacked actor. Having the
dialogue game [27,36] in the representation can interact nicely with ethical as-
pects of argumentation by e.g. penalizing trustworthiness when illogical moves
are made or undefendable stances are taken. The representation is also a good
basis for deriving a per-participant semantics incorporating voiced beliefs and
trust relations of actors to approximate what they are likely to believe.
We have proposed T-AFs as an exemplary simplified version of T-AIF, aimed
at defining properties profiling the participating actors. T-AFs do not include
the dialogue part of T-AIF, and there are meta-arguments — that is, argu-
ments talking about the discussion itself, which in fact occur rather frequently
— that become expressible when the dialogue is included in the structure. An
example of this kind are arguments against an actor’s credibility on the premise
that she has retracted previous statements she had high commitment to when
counterarguments were given.
Since the tooling around the AIF ecosystem only supports some features of
T-AIF, we plan to provide tool support for creating, storing, and visualizing
argument structures in our format. The envisioned tool support will also include
reasoning capabilities beyond the described ASPIC+ translation for working on
a given T-AIF graph directly.
As maybe apparent from our choice of examples, we plan to evaluate our
formalism on a dataset of argumentative discourse on Twitter, specifically con-
cerning Brexit (pre-referendum). Ultimately, we intend to construct T-AIF rep-
resentations automatically from written discussions using a structured argument-
ation mining algorithm.
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A Appendix
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Figure 2. The AIF+ Ontology. The boxes are concepts and the arrows represent the
inclusion relation. L-nodes, TA-nodes, and Transition Schemes [36] as well as YA-nodes
and Illocutionary Schemes [35] were added to AIF.
